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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Carter challenges the district court's improper reliance at sentencing on 
information obtained during a competency evaluation, and improper inclusion of 
information from his competency evaluations in the presentence investigation report 
materials. In addition, Mr. Carter has challenged the district court's failure to order a 
mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522 for purposes of 
sentencing. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the State's contentions on 
appeal. While the State has argued that Mr. Carter's assertion of a violation of his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination was waived because this issue was not 
raised before the district court, it is well-established that a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination is a fundamental error that can be raised for 
the first time on appeal. In addition, Mr. Carter's claims regarding the district court's 
improper use of the competency evaluation materials at sentencing are justiciable for 
the first time on appeal as an abuse of the court's discretion because the district court's 
actions were in contravention of clear legal standards. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Carter's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Whether Mr. Carter has demonstrated fundamental error where the district court 
used the competency evaluation at sentencing and Mr. Carter did not waive his 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
2. Whether the district court's failure to order a psychological evaluation pursuant to 




Mr. Carter's Has Demonstrated Fundamental Error At Sentencing Through Violation Of 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
A. Mr. Carter's Claim That The District Court's Use Of His Competency Evaluation 
At Sentencing Violated His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination Is 
Properly Justiciable By This Court As A Fundamental Error 
The State asserts that Mr. Carter's claim of a violation of his Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination was waived because he failed to object to the 
district court's use of his competency evaluation against Mr. Carter at sentencing. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) While defense counsel appears not to have raised any 
objection to the district court's admission and consideration of these materials, in both 
the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and as evidence in making its 
sentencing determination, this assertion of error may be properly reviewed by this Court 
as it constitutes a fundamental error that can be raised for the first time on appeal. 1 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have held that violations 
of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination constitutes a 
fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
White, 97 Idaho 70S, 714 n.S (1976); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279 (Ct. App. 2007); 
1 The State correctly notes in its Respondent's Brief that the issue of fundamental error 
was not raised in the initial Appellant's Brief. However, pursuant to 1.A.R.35(c), a reply 
brief, "may contain additional argument in rebuttal to the contentions of the respondent." 
I.A.R. 35(c). Because the justiciability of the Fifth Amendment issue was raised by the 
State in its Respondent's Brief, Mr. Carter may properly rebut the State's contention in 
this Reply Brief. 
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State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671,678 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Po/and, 116 Idaho 34, 
36 (Ct. App. 1989), State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 597 (1992). 
The State also asserts that Mr. Carter has not raised a violation of a 
constitutional right because he was not compelled to speak at the competency 
evaluation. (Resp. Sr., p.5.) Contrary to the State's assertion, a competency 
examination is compulsory, thus the Fifth Amendment is implicated. Estelle v. Smith, 
451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) ("when faced while in custody with a court-ordered psychiatric 
inquiry, respondent's statements to Dr. Grigson were not 'given freely and voluntarily 
without any compelling influences' and, as such, could be used as the State did at the 
penalty phase only if respondent had been apprised of his rights and had knowingly 
decided to waive them."). 
B. Buchanan Does Not Stand For The Proposition That An Unwarned Competency 
Evaluation May Be Used At Sentencing Where The Defense Presents Mental 
Health Evidence 
Buchanan does not stand for the proposition "that an unwarned competency 
evaluation may still be used at sentencing where the defense presents mental health 
evidence." (See Resp. Sr., p.6.) Buchanan did not involve a competency evaluation, 
but instead involved a statute for involuntary hospitalization for psychiatric treatment. 
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 411 (1987). "The purpose of a motion made 
pursuant to this provision is to enable a defendant to receive psychiatric treatment, not 
to determine his competency to stand trial. The latter is governed by another statutory 
procedure." Id. at 411 n.11 (emphasis in original). "The trial court also ordered a 
psychological evaluation of petitioner for competency purposes but kept the report 
confidential from both sides and used it only for its own determination." Id. Therefore, 
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the State's claim that a competency evaluation can be used at sentencing under 
Buchanan is not supported by the case law. The proper use of a competency 
evaluation is laid out in the text of I.C. § 18-215; no other use is permitted by law. 
C. Under State v. Perry, The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Using 
Mr. Carter's Competency Evaluation Against Him At Sentencing 
The State asserts that, in light of State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P .3d 
961,978 (2010), State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,820 (Ct. App. 2010), is no longer 
authoritative. (Resp. Br., p.6.) However, using the Perry fundamental error test, the 
results in Jockumsen and this case are unchanged. Under State v. Perry, Mr. Carter 
must show 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _245 P.3d 961,978 (2010). 
Mr. Carter has demonstrated fundamental error. As stated in the previous 
section, Mr. Carter's constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated. 
Mr. Carter did not waive this right, as discussed below. Additionally, the error is clear 
and obvious in the record and the failure to object to the inclusion of the competency 
evaluation was not a tactical decision. Finally, Mr. Carter has demonstrated that the 
error actually affected his substantial rights because the district court used the 
competency evaluation against him at sentencing. 
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1. Mr. Carter Was Compelled To Speak And Did Not Waive His 
Constitutional Rights To Be Free From Self-Incrimination 
The State asserts that Mr. Carter does not have a constitutional claim because 
his attorney requested the competency evaluation and, therefore, Mr. Carter was not 
compelled to speak. (Resp. Br., pp.5-6.) However, this assertion fails because 
Mr. Carter the statements were in fact compelled and Mr. Carter never waived his Fifth 
Amendment right. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981). "When faced while 
in custody with a court-ordered psychiatric inquiry, respondent's statements to 
Dr. Grigson were not 'given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences' 
and, as such, could be used as the State did at the penalty phase only if respondent 
had been apprised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them." Id. 
In order for Mr. Carter's statements made in the competency evaluation to be 
used at sentencing, there must be evidence that 1) Mr. Carter was apprised of his 
privilege against self-incrimination as it applies to the competency evaluation, and 2) he 
actually waived those rights. State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,820 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (holding that statements made for the 
purpose of a competency evaluation may be used "only if respondent had been 
apprised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them."». The record does 
not show that Mr. Carter was ever apprised of his rights, nor is there any indication that 
he waived his rights. (See generally, Tr.) 
The State has failed to meet it's burden to show Mr. Carter actually waived his 
rights. '''[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental 
constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights.' A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
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of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a fundamental right and a valid waiver 
of that right is not presumed unless demonstrated by the record. State v. Browning, 121 
Idaho 239, 243 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden is on the State to show a waiver. State v. 
Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 45 (Ct. App. 2008). In this case, the State does not 
point to any place in the record where the district court informs Mr. Carter that his 
competency exam could be used against him, or that Mr. Carter has the right to prevent 
the competency evaluation from being attached to the PSI. 
The State argues that, because Mr. Carter's attorney requested the competency 
evaluation, there is no constitutional violation because it was not a compulsory 
statement. (See Resp. Br., p.6.) The fact that Mr. Carter's attorney requested the 
competency evaluation made the evaluation no less compulsory for Mr. Carter. It is a 
common practice for attorneys to request competency evaluations without the consent 
of their clients. See State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 819 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Upon 
defense counsel's request, the magistrate court ordered that Jockumsen be evaluated 
for mental competence to stand trial, and he was initially found to be incompetent."); 
see also ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Mental Health, Mental Retardation, And 
Criminal Justice: General Professional Obligations, Std. 7-4.2(c) ("Defense counsel 
should move for evaluation of the defendant's competence to stand trial whenever the 
defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to the defendant's competence. If the client 
objects to such a motion being made, counsel may move for evaluation over the 
client's objection. In any event, counsel should make known to the court and to the 
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prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the good faith doubt of 
competence.") . 
Had Mr. Carter been informed that the competency evaluation was to be used 
against him, and had Mr. Carter also actually waived his rights, the State's claim of 
wavier would have merit. As it stands, there is no evidence in the record of a waiver by 
Mr. Carter. 
2. The Error Was Clear On The Record And Was Not A Tactical Decision 
While the State attempts to cast the failure of defense counsel to object as a 
strategic decision, the Court in White makes clear that the "inference of strategic by-
passing of constitutional objections occurs only when there is strong indication that 
counsel knew of the potential objection and chose to ignore it. " White, 97 Idaho at 714 
n.S. Here, there is no record that defense counsel knew of the Fifth Amendment 
violation incurred by the district court's use of Mr. Carter's competency evaluations at 
sentencing and by the inclusion of this material in his PSI. Mr. Carter's attorney never 
acknowledged the right, nor did the district court inform Mr. Carter of his rights. 
The State also claims that Mr. Carter's attorney did not object to the 
constitutional violation as a tactical decision, because Mr. Carter and his attorney 
agreed to the use of Mr. Carter's prior Idaho Department of Corrections mental health 
records at sentencing , therefore, Mr. Carter implicitly agreed to allow the competency 
evaluation to be used against him as well. (See Resp. Br., p.7.) The section of the 
transcript cited by the State does not support this assertion, nor does it mention the 
competency evaluation at all ; only Department of Corrections mental health records are 
requested. (Tr. 7/13/2010, p.27, Ls.3-11 .) Mr. Carter had been receiving mental health 
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treatment at the Idaho Department of Corrections for many years while incarcerated. 
(PSI, pp.2-3) The logical inference is that, while Mr. Carter was being treated for mental 
illness in prison, IDOC was creating records, and those are the records his attorney was 
requesting. It is a far greater leap in logic to presume that the request for "records" 
actually means a competency evaluation that is prohibited from being used at 
sentencing by statute. This Court would have to further presume Mr. Carter's attorney 
was actually intending to wave his client's Fifth Amendment rights, without his client's 
knowledge or consent. 
The State's assertion also presumes that Mr. Carter's attorney could waive his 
client's Fifth Amendment rights, without his client's knowledge and consent. Even if the 
State had evidence that this was Mr. Carter's attorney's intent, the decision to waive the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not a strategic decision that can 
be made by the attorney. The decision whether to allow compelled testimony protected 
by the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal decision to be made by the client 
alone. 'The defendant personally is vested with the ultimate authority to decide whether 
or not to testify. Counsel may advise the defendant regarding the wisdom and propriety 
of testifying; but counsel must abide by the defendant's eventual decision." State v. 
Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 690 (Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1987) ("[The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination] is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' ... The choice of 
whether to testify in one's own defense '" is an exercise of the constitutional 
privilege."'). Although these cases deal with a client's decision to testify, the principles 
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are the same-when the privilege against self-incrimination is implicated, it is the 
defendant's decision alone whether to waive the right. Waiving the privilege against 
self-incrimination is not a strategic choice that the attorney can make. 
3. The Error Affected Mr. Carter's Rights Because The District Court Actually 
Used The Competency Evaluation Against Him At Sentencing 
Mr. Carter has demonstrated that the error affected his substantial rights 
because the district court relied on the competency evaluation in imposing a harsher 
sentence. (See App. Br., pp.9-12.) "Imposition of a harsher sentence within this 
expansive range based on a defendant's statements in a psychological evaluation is a 
violation of the right against self-incrimination." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564 
(2006). It is clear from the record that the competency evaluation "infected the 
sentence." See State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500 (2006). The error in Cope was 
deemed harmless largely because there was ample information presented to the district 
court from sources unrelated to the competency evaluation that informed the district 
court regarding the mental health issues suffered by the defendant. Cope, 142 Idaho at 
500-502. This included materials regarding prior involuntary psychiatric commitments 
that were provided by the defense and the testimony provided by the defense's own 
mental health expert at sentencing. Id. In this case, unlike Cope, there was no other 
source of information regarding Mr. Carter's mental illnesses and conditions that was 
not fatally infected with information taken directly from the competency evaluations. 
(See App. Br., pp.8-11.) 
For all the reasons stated above, Mr. Carter has demonstrated fundamental error 
under Perry, supra. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disregard of I.C.R. 32 
And I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of 
Mr. Carter Prior To Sentencing 
A. Standard Of Review And Justiciability 
The State asserts that Mr. Carter may not argue abuse of discretion for manifest 
disregard of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522 because there was no contemporaneous 
objection. (Resp. Sr., pp.B-9.) The State cites no case for its assertion that Mr. Carter 
may not argue abuse of discretion at sentencing without a contemporaneous objection. 
Furthermore, the State's claim is contrary to Idaho case law. "A claim that the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation of a 
defendant before sentencing can be made on appeal without an objection to the lack of 
an evaluation or a request for an evaluation before the district court." State v. Durham, 
146 Idaho 364, 366 (Ct. App. 200B) (emphasis added). 
It is well-established that the standard that this Court applies to a review of a 
sentence on appeal is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 37B, 
3B4 (Ct. App. 200B); State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74-75 (Ct. App. 2005). The three-
part test for an abuse of discretion is equally well-established-this Court will review the 
district court's sentencing determination for (1) whether the district court correctly 
recognized the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the court acted within the proper 
boundaries of that discretion and consistently with the legal standards that are 
applicable to the district court's discretionary determination; and (3) whether the district 
court reached its decision through the exercise of reason. Id. It is the second prong of 
the inquiry that is at stake in this appeal - whether the district court acted in violation of 
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applicable legal standards attendant to its discretion at sentencing when the court 
considered evidence from Mr. Carter's competency evaluation in several aspects of its 
sentencing decision. 
The controlling case on this issue, State v. Cope, makes clear that this type of 
error falls within the category of an abuse of discretion based upon the failure to follow 
legal standards that are applicable to the court's sentencing determinations. As stated 
by the Court in Cope: 
Ultimately the determination of whether a particular sentence is an 
abuse of discretion depends upon the information that is used in framing 
the sentence. If a defendant who retains the right to challenge a sentence 
is precluded from challenging the use of information that is statutorily 
excluded or false or otherwise improper, the right to appeal would be 
rendered meaningless 
Retention of the right to appeal a sentence is not so limited. It 
extends to the underlying information that forms the basis of the sentence. 
Cope, 142 Idaho at 499. 
Idaho Code section 18-215 extends a statutory grant of immunity to defendants 
for all statements made in the course of competency evaluations, and this provision of 
statutory immunity extends to sentencing proceedings. Furthermore, this statute placed 
a clear prohibition on the power of the district court to inject these materials into 
evidence at sentencing. I.C. § 18-215. In addition, sentencing determinations are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, including whether the district court followed 
applicable law. As such, the issue of whether the district court acted in contravention of 
the applicable provisions of I.C. § 18-215 at sentencing is properly before this Court. 
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B. The State's Claim That The District Court Had Adequate Mental Health Evidence 
At Sentencing Presumes The Competency Evaluation Was Properly Before The 
District Court At Sentencing 
The State also asserts that there was no manifest disregard of Rule 32 because 
there was adequate mental health evidence before the court at sentencing. (Resp. Br., 
pp.11-14.) The fundamental flaw of this argument is that the mental health evidence 
before the court was all from competency evaluations, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. See section I, supra; see a/so, App. Br, pp.5-9. The State's argument is 
that a competency evaluation is an appropriate substitute for a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. This argument is without merit and contrary to Idaho case 
law. See Jockumsen, supra; State v. Banbury, 145 Idaho 265,270 (Ct. App. 2007). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Carter respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence, and remand 
his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation of Mr. Carter's mental 
health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Further, he 
requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions to order a 
new presentence investigation report that omits the contents and conclusions of his 
competency evaluations, and further instruct the district court to forward the new 
presentence report to the Department of Correction. In the alternative, he asks that this 
Court reverse the district court's judgment of conviction and remand this case for further 
proceedings. ~ 
DATED this 9th day of September, 2011.. /?-I~ 
./~ "~ 
~ , V 
JORDA~E. TAYLOR ' 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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